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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL VERBURG,
Petitioner,
vs.
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION and
OGDEN CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Respondents.

:

DOCKETING STATEMENT

:

Appeal No. 20080139

:

Labor Commission No. 04-1130

:
Priority 7
:

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
MICHAEL VERBURG (EMPLOYEE)

JURISDICTION
This Petition for Review seeks review of the Final Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration of the Commission entered January 14, 2008, as well as the underlying
Order Reversing ALLs Decision and Denying Benefits, dated November 19, 2007, as
referenced therein, which Order denied benefits to Employee, Michael Verburg, based on
his June 17, 2004 industrial accident, contrary to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order by the Administrative Law Judge dated October 6, 2005.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues on this appeal are three-fold: (1) Whether the Labor Commission erred
in its application of the Allen" test for "Legal Causation" to the unexpected occurrence of
Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d 15 (Utah, 1986)

Employee striking his head against the car door jamb; (2) Whether the Labor Commission
erred in rendering its medical conclusion that Employee's vision "going black" for a
moment was related to his preexisting cervical problems, a conclusion not supported by
the medical records; and (3) Whether the Labor Commission erred in considering the
issue of "Medical Causation" of Employee's injury when the sole issue before the ALJ
was that of "Legal Causation."
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review varies in matters involving appeals from the Labor
Commission. Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are generally
reviewed for correctness.2 The Appeals Court reviews the legal determinations of the
Commission under a similar standard, "[CJeding the board no deference as appellate
courts have 'the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform
throughout the jurisdiction.'"3
This Court has similarly declared that, since, "The Allen test is a judicially crafted
rule that the Commission is in no better position to interpret than this court", whether the
Commission erroneously interpreted and applied that decision "is a question of law
reviewed for correctness."4

2

Esquivel v. Labor Comm % 2000 UT 66, 7 P. 3d 777 (Utah, 2000).

'Salt Lake City Corp. v. Utah Labor Comm % 153 P. 3d 179, 181 (Utah, 2007)
"Acosta v. Labor Comm % 2002 UT App. 67, ^10, 44 P. 3d 819 (Utah App., 2002)
-2-

On the other hand, the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact has
been summarized as follows:
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to
determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming before
it. See Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-301 (1997)... As such, we must uphold
the Commission's determination . . . unless the determination exceeds the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of
discretion under 63-46b-16(h)(i) of the UAPA. . . . Moreover, we resolve,
"[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation in favor of the injured
employee.'* £>rafe v. Industrial Comm % 939 P. 2d 177, 182 (Utah, 1997)
(citation omitted).D
Finally, the Court reviews Commission rulings in workers compensation cases,
particularly those that result in a denial of benefits, with a "heightened degree of
oversight" in order to give effect to the purpose of the act to alleviate hardship on workers
and their families. As the Court explained in Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Comm 'n:
We will therefore look closely to assure ourselves that the Commission has
liberally construed and applied the Act to provide coverage and has
resolved any doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of an
injured employee.6
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1999) provides the basic statutory outline for
compensability of injuries to employees as follows:
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of
and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury
5

AE Clevite v. Labor Comm 'n, 996 P. 2d 1072, 1074 (Utah App., 2000), cert. den.
4 P. 3d 1289 (Utah, 2000)
6

Supra, note 3 at 182
-3-

occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
[benefits]

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Employee filed an Application for Hearing with the Commission on December 13,
2004, claiming entitlement for worker's compensation benefits arising out of two alleged
industrial accidents which Employee claimed had resulted in his injuries.
An evidentiary hearing was held on June 7, 2005, before the Honorable Lorrie
Lima, Administrative Law Judge, at which time Employee voluntarily withdrew his claim
regarding the injury of March 24, 2004 and proceeded on his claim for the June 17, 2004
injury.
Judge Lima entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in this
matter on October 6, 2005. In that Order, Judge Lima determined that Employee had
aggravated his preexisting condition on June 17, 2004 when he struck his head while
attempting to get into his car at the end of a shift. While recognizing that Employee must
meet the higher burden of "legal causation" under Allen, Judge Lima found that the
preponderance of the evidence established that Employee had met that higher burden and
benefits were awarded.
Employer timely filed a Motion for Review, asserting that Employee's work
related accident did not satisfy the higher burden of "legal causation" under Allen. The
Labor Commission granted Employer's Motion for Review and entered its Order

-4-

Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits on November 19. 2007. It based that
reversal upon its detennination that Employee had failed to establish that the employment
activity, "involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the * usual wear
and tear and exertions of nonemployment life"' and that the event complained of was,
rather, "a relatively routine event in which he bumped his head as he slid into the driver's
seat."
On December 5, 2007, Employee timely filed his Motion for Reconsideration of
the Commission's Order.
On January 14, 2008, the Commission entered its Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration.
On February 13, 2008, Employee timely filed his Petition for Review with this
Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Employee believes that the following Statement of Facts substantially reflects all
of the relevant and material facts of this case, as established at the Hearing before the
Honorable Lorrie Lima, Administrative Law Judge, on June 7, 2005. The majority of
these were outlined in the Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Order of Judge Lima
dated October 6, 2005,7 and were based upon the undisputed testimony of Employee and
the medical records:

7

R. (vol. 1) at 00037
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1. Employee worked for Ogden City as a Community Service Officer8.
2. Employee had a history of cervical spine problems relating back to November
of 2002 when an MRI reflected multi-level degenerative disc disease. Due to ongoing
complaints of pain and headaches, Employee underwent an anterior cervical
microdiscectomy and fusion at C5-6 and C6-7 levels on December 10, 20029.
3. Employee underwent an anterior cervical discectomy at C4-5 with
decompression of the nerve root, and an anterior cervical fusion at C4-5 for degenerative
disc disease at C4-5 due to multiple levels of degenerative disc disease superimposed on
post-op changes, on April 19, 2004.10
4. Following the April 19, 2004 surgery. Employee's neck felt better than before
the surgery and the pain "pretty much went away." Employee "was quite happy with the
results.11
5. Employee was released to return to his regular work on June 8, 200412. His
doctor's notes on that date state, "Overall he reports that he has had good improvement in
pain . . . He is not taking any real pain medications at this time."13

8

R. (vol. 3) at 10; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

9

R. (vol. 2) at 054

10

R. (vol. 2) at 054; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

n

R. (vol. 3) at 23; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041

12

R. (vol. 3) at 24; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

13

R. (vol. 2) at 057
-6-

6. On June 17, 2004, at the conclusion of Employee's work shift, he had to get his
stuff out of the patrol car, because the officers had to share cars. He was "standing facing
the front of the car" and his body was in motion from a standing to sitting position as he
went to "kind of scoot sideways" onto the seat.14 With the force of that momentum, he
struck his head on the top of the door frame on the right side, "halfway between the
crown and the top of my head and ear."]i The continuous movement of his body and
weight added more force to the impact of his head and neck on the door
jam.16"Everything went black for a couple of seconds" and he "just sat there in the car"
but he did not believe he was actually unconscious.17 Although there was an indication in
the medical records that he "hit car door by turning too fast,"18 Employee clarified that the
injury had occurred as he had testified and that "I didn't do any twisting."19 As it was the
end of the shift on a Friday, he did not return to work but got the rest of the stuff out of
the vehicle and went home.20
7. Employee also described a prior incident in which he had hit his head on a
garage door, an event which he described as follows:
14

R. (vol. 3) at 25; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041

]5

R. (vol. 3) at 11 - 12; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041

16

R. (vol. 1) at 00041

17

R. (vol. 3) at 12; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

18

R. (vol. 2) at 138

19

R. (vol. 3) at 26

20

R. (vol. 3) at 13; R. (vol. 1) at 00038
-7-

I didn't really hit it really hard on the garage door. What it was, is about there was a walkabout on row on 2nd Street, and I was on a call where a car
had broke through the lady's garage door and left. And I was responding
on the hit-and-run call. I guess the car went through the garage door and
smashed it up and actually hit the car inside the garage and pushed it
forward. And the garage door was kind of hanging down a little bit, and as
I went underneath it, I can't - my head doesn't bend as much anymore. I
just hit - caught my head on the garage door.21
He went on to explain that, in that prior incident, his vision did not go black and he
did not have to stop and rest after the incident and "just kept doing my job."22
8. After the accident of June 17, 2004, Employee initially had no other
symptoms. However, unlike the prior event with the garage door, about an hour
afterwards, after he got home, he started having problems.23 His pain progressively
worsened.24 There was a lot of pain in the center of his neck and pain radiating
back in his shoulders and, since it was shortly after surgery he was concerned that
he might have disrupted his fusion..25
9. When the pain worsened and Employee told his sergeant what had
happened, he was directed to the emergency room26, where the doctor took him off

21

R. (vol. 3) at 15

22

Id.

23

R. (vol. 3) at 13, 24; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

24

R. (vol. 3) at 16; R. (vol. 1) at 00038, 00041

25

Id.

26

R. (vol. 3) at 17
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work until he met with his surgeon. After he saw his surgeon, he was taken off
work until after the surgery and recuperation.27
10. Employee's doctor's notes on July 13, 2004, reflect, "He states that he
was doing quite well until he hit his head on a car and states that now he has
similar pain to what he has had previously, prior to the surgery."28
11. Although subsequent initial X-rays and evaluation reflected a stable
fusion and was diagnosed as a muscle strain, pain continued to increase.
Employee continued to receive treatment and pain medications through June 2,
2005, when Dr. Brown issued an independent medical evaluation, which noted his
pre-existing condition and opined a medical nexus between the injury of June 17,
2004 and the complaints of increased cervical spine pain. He found medical
treatment through that date was medically necessary due to the industrial injury of
June 17, 2004 and that further treatment of the condition would include pain
management for significant neck pain without further surgery.29
12. Employee was finally released to return to work on January 10, 2005.30
13. At the commencement of the hearing, Employee noted that there was a
pre-existing injury and that the issue to be determined "is just going to be legal
27

R. (vol. 3) at 17; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

28

R. (vol. 2) at 059; R. (vol. 1) at 00039

29

R. (vol. 2) at 232 - 233; R. (vol. 1) at 00038

30

R (vol. 3) at 17; R. (vol. 1) at 00039
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causation,"31 Employer agreed with Employee's indication in that regard and
confirmed that their contention was that the bump on the head "does not satisfy the
higher legal causation standard of Allen."32
14. Following the Hearing, in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Order, Judge Lima recognized that, although medical causation was satisfied,
due to the pre-existing condition of Employee, the more stringent test for "legal
causation" under Allen, must also be satisfied. In that regard, Judge Lima
determined:
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the direct force
Petitioner experienced moving from a standing to sitting position while
propelling his body sideways with such a force, that when he struck his
head his vision went black, was not a typical exertion experienced by men
and women in modern non-employment life. While getting into a motor
vehicle is typical of modern non-employment life, such exertion does not
typically involve the combination of factors presented here. Specifically,
the continuous movement of Petitioner's body and weight added more force
to the impact of Petitioner's head and neck on the door jam which was
unusual and extraordinary and satisfies the requirement of legal causation.
This extra exertion served to offset the preexisting condition of Petitioner as
the likely cause of the injury. Moreover, how Petitioner felt before and
after the [sic] June 17, 2004, evidences the degree offeree exerted by
Petitioner. Following surgery in April, 2004, Petitioner felt better than
before the surgery and he was happy with the result. However, following
June 17, 2004, Petitioner experienced significantly increased pain in his
cervical spine.33

31

R. (vol. 3) at 6

32

R. (vol. 3) at 7

33

R. (vol. 1) at 00041 (Order is attached as Addendum 1 to this Brief)
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Judge Lima then determined that Employee's exertion at the time of the accident was
sufficient to satisfy Allen's higher standard of "legal causation/'
15. In its Order Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits, the Commission
noted that the parties did not dispute Judge Lima's findings.34
16. In that Order, the Commission then determined that Allen and its progeny
declare that, when a claimant suffers from a pre-existing condition such as that of the
Employee in this case, the claimant must show "that the employment activity involved
some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the 'usual wear and tear and
exertions of nonemployment life.'"3:) The Commission declared:
Usually, the exertion can be easily classified as "unusual or extraordinary"
and compensable, or "usual and ordinary" and noncompensable. Mr.
Verburg's exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no way
to determine the force with which he hit his head on his car door.36
17. The Commission went on to declare that the record indicated Mr. Verburg's
accident "appears to have been a relatively routine event in which he bumped his head as
he slid into the driver's seat."37 Finally, the Commission concluded:
The Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision
going dark is a measure of the force of impact. The Commission also notes
the absence of any evidence of bruising or other marks from the impact. In

34

R. (vol. 1) at 00059 (Order is attached as Addendum 2 to this Brief)

3S

R. (vol. 1) at 00060

36

R. (vol. 1) at 00061

37

Id.
-11-

summary, the Commission finds that the evidence does not establish that
the exertion involved in Mr. Verburg's accident was unusual or
extraordinary.38
18. On December 5, 2007, Employee timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the Commission's Order on the basis that it contained factual errors regarding the
activities of Employee when he was injured and legal errors with regard to the manner of
its application of Allen and in its consideration of the undisputed issue of medical
causation.39
19. On January 14, 2008, the Commission entered its Order Denying Request for
Reconsideration, again reflecting its determination that Mr. Verburg experienced a
"relatively routine event" and, as such, did not satisfy the test for legal causation under
Allen. In the course of that Order, the Commission further set forth its medical
conclusion that Employee's vision "going black" for a moment was "more reasonably
related to Mr. Verburg's preexisting cervical problems,"40 a conclusion unsupported by
any appropriate findings or any medical records or opinions.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
POINT I.

The Commission erred in the manner it applied the Allen test for "legal
causation" to the unexpected occurrence of Employee striking his head
against the car door frame.

38

M

39

R.(vol. 1) at 00063

40

R. (vol. 1) at 00080 (Order is attached as Addendum 3 to this Brief)
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Allen's "legal causation" test was intended to weed out aggravations of preexisting
conditions which just happen to occur while an employee is at work but performing
activities of normal everyday nonemployment life while at work. It requires that the
employee be subjected to some exertion "greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday
life." In applying that test to Employee's injury, the Commission erroneously determined
that Employee's sudden, unexpected event of impacting his head on the car door frame
was a "relatively routine event41" which was not uncommon to normal everyday life and,
therefore, did not meet that "legal causation" test.
People do, at times, suffer sudden unexpected events while engaged in "normal
everyday" activities such as those referenced in Allen, such as falling while climbing a
normal flight of stairs. However, such sudden unexpected events are not part of "normal"
everyday life. Rather, they constitute "abnormal" events occurring during everyday life.
With such a sudden unexpected event, there is a clear and direct relationship
between that identifiable event and the resulting injury. Such instances are significantly
different from the aggravations of preexisting conditions which Allen was trying to weed
out, such as where an employee, while lifting a normal garbage can at work, feels a pain
and claims an aggravation of a preexisting back injury as a result.
Utah case law confirms that the test under Allen is not whether the type of exertion
which caused the injury is unknown in nonemployment life but, rather, whether it exceeds
exertion used in "normal everyday" nonemployment life. The uncontradicted evidence
4]

Supra, note 36
-13-

presented at the hearing demonstrates that the Employee met that higher standard of
"legal cause." The facts surrounding the incident, as set forth in Employee's Statement of
Facts,42 do not reflect a "relatively routine event" or a mere bump on the head. Rather,
they reflect that there was a forceful impact as found by Judge Lima:
The direct force Petitioner experienced moving from a standing to sitting
position while propelling his body sideways with such a force, that when he
struck his head his vision went black. . . The continuous movement of
Petitioner's body and weight added more force to the impact of Petitioner's
head and neck on the door jam which was unusual and extraordinary.43
The Commission's conclusion that those facts failed to meet the "legal
causation" test of Allen was erroneous, contrary to the law, and exceeded the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
POINT II. The Commission erred in basing its decision on findings and
conclusions without adequate supported in the record.
In supporting its conclusion that the facts of Employee's accident did not meet the
"legal causation" test of'Allen, the Commission relied upon findings and conclusions
which were not supported by the evidence and, rather, appear to have been improperly
based solely on the Commission's assumptions without finding support in the record.
The Commission concluded, "Mr. Verburg's exertion is more difficult to characterize
because there is no way to determine the force with which he hit his head on his car
door;" "The Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision going

42

Statement of Facts Nos. 5-8

43

Supra, note 33
-14-

dark is a measure of impact," and "The Commission also notes the absence of any
evidence of bruising or other marks from the impact."44
In its subsequent Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission
further concluded:
(1) The fact that Mr. Verburg experienced an unusual reaction to that event
- his vision 'going black' for a moment - does not change the nature or
force of the impact itself, but is more reasonably related to Mr. Verburg's
preexisting cervical problems."415
Judge Lima's Findings of Fact, which were not disputed by the parties, established
a significant factual basis upon which Judge Lima and the Commission could readily
determine that the event in question involved an exertion which was not comparable to
that encountered in "normal everyday nonemployment life," which was all that was
required to meet the Allen test of "legal causation."
There was no medical evidence or testimony in the record relating the fact of
Employee's vision going black with his preexisting cervical problems. Even if there had
been such a relationship established in the medical record, it would not change the fact
that it was the unusual exertion of that impact which was the cause of his vision going
black.
Not only was there no evidence in the records concerning the existence or nonexistence of such bruising or marks, but the Employee did not see a doctor until the first

4A[

Supra, note 36

^ Supra, note 40
-15-

part of July, long enough after the June 17 incident for such marks to have significantly
decreased or disappeared.
The Commission reflects an inconsistent approach to "legal causation" by refusing
to consider the Employee's vision going black as reflecting the force of the impact while
implying that bruising or other marks would have been considered for that purpose,
without any explanation of why they assumed bruises would better support the amount of
force of that impact more than Employee's vision going black.
The Commission's reliance upon these unsupported assumptions and inconsistent
approaches to determining the force of the impact, were contrary to the Commission's
obligation to liberally construe and apply the Act to provide coverage and to resolve any
doubt respecting the right to compensation in favor of an injured employee and reflect
that the Commission exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so as to
constitute an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN THE MANNER IT APPLIED THE ALLEN
TEST FOR "LEGAL CAUSATION" TO THE UNEXPECTED
OCCURRENCE OF EMPLOYEE STRIKING HIS HEAD AGAINST
THE CAR DOOR FRAME.
Utah Code Anno. §34A-2-401 (1999) provides the basic statutory outline for
compensability of injuries to employees as follows:
(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of
-16-

and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
[benefits]
Prior to Allen, the Utah Courts had adopted an "unusual exertion" rule with regard
to the aggravation of preexisting injuries. That rule basically examined the work which
the employee was performing at the time of the injury and whether the exertion was
unusual to his normal employment activities. In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court
extensively examined the problems with the "unusual exertion" rule and recognized that it
created serious problems, among which was that an employee whose job entailed lifting
heavy loads was not protected while lifting, while another employee lifting the same
loads, who did not normally perform such lifting, was protected. Relying extensively on
Professor Larson's46 insight into the unworkability of the "unusual exertion" standard, as
well as the "inconsistent and confused approach" demonstrated by a chronological
reading of the prior Utah cases utilizing that standard, the Court concluded:
Because we find the present use of the usual-unusual distinction unhelpful
and our prior precedent inconsistent, we take this opportunity to examine an
alternative causation analysis that may better meet the objectives of the
workers' compensation laws. We are mindful that the key question in
determining causation is whether, given this body and this exertion, the
exertion in fact contributed to the injury.47
With that caveat, the Court went on to explain:
Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, he or she is not
disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear that "the
aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing condition must show that the
46
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employment contributed something substantial to increase the risk he
already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This additional
element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an exertion greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This extra exertion serves
to offset the preexisting condition of the employee as a likely cause of the
injury, thereby eliminating claims for impairments resulting from a personal
risk rather than exertions at work.48
The Court then adopted the two-part test, which has come to be referred to as the
u

Allen Test," to be applied to weed out aggravations of preexisting conditions which just

happen to occur while an employee is performing "normal" exertions of "everyday
nonemployment life" while at work. It requires that, in addition to establishing the
"medical cause" of the injury, the employee must establish the "legal cause." To meet that
higher standard, the employee's body must have been subjected to some exertion "greater
than that undertaken in normal, everyday life." To help clarify what type of activities
would be considered as those undertaken in "normal everyday life, " the Court cited a
number of examples, namely, "taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest
height, and climbing the stairs in buildings."49
There is no doubt but that people do, at times, suffer sudden unexpected events
while they are engaged in any number of "normal" activities of "everyday
nonemployment life." They slip while carrying full garbage cans to the street, they are
injured when jacks slip while they are changing flat tires, they collide with other objects
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while driving their automobiles, they fall while climbing a normal flight of stairs and, as
in this case, they bang their heads into a car door frames while entering cars. However,
while such sudden unexpected events certainly occur, they are not part of''normal,
everyday life." Rather, they constitute "abnormal" events occurring during "everyday
life."
The Allen Court's examples included only incidents which one encounters in
''normal everyday life" and which involved unexpected results, rather than sudden
unexpected events. We submit that it was no coincidence that the Court did not include
in its list any sudden, unexpected events, such as automobile collisions, falls while
climbing stairs, or bangs to the head on car door frames. After all, the Court's stated
purpose in creating the new test was to weed out aggravations of preexisting conditions
which just happened to occur while the employee was at work, performing "normal"
exertions of "everyday nonemployment life."
The Allen test was not intended to preclude employees from recovering for
injuries received in a sudden unexpected event occurring at work, merely because they
could have been involved someday in a similar type of sudden unexpected event in their
"everyday nonemployment life." Such an interpretation would unreasonably bar
recoveries by a vast number, if not a majority, of the employees injured at work since, as
previously reflected, many of the sudden unexpected events at work could as readily have
occurred during the employee's "everyday nonemployment life." However, nothing in
Allen reflects that the Court intended that the mere fact that the sudden unexpected event
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could have occurred as readily away from work as at work should bar a recovery for
aggravation of a preexisting condition arising from such an event.
The Court's concern in Allen was with incidents where the preexisting condition
just happened to become symptomatic at the time an employee was performing some
activity for the employer. As the Court noted, the "key question" which the "'Allen Test"
was created to determine, "[I]s whether, given this body and this exertion, the exertion in
fact contributed to the injury.50
With a sudden unexpected event such as falling while climbing a normal flight of
stairs, being in an automobile collision, or banging one's head on a car door frame while
at work, there is a clear and direct relationship between that identifiable incident and the
resulting injury. Such an instance is significantly different from an incident where an
employee, while lifting a garbage can at work feels a pain and claims an aggravation of a
preexisting back injury as a result.
Allen clearly did not bar employees from recovery for aggravation of a preexisting
condition which occurs while performing normal activity of "everyday nonemployment
life," when that activity is undertaken in such a manner that the exertion exceeds that
which persons encounter in "normal everyday nonemployment life." The facts in Allen
itself involved an employee who felt a sharp pain in his lower back while he was lifting a
crate containing four to six gallons of milk (certainly less weight than a full garbage can)
from the floor onto a cooler shelf about chest height. The Commission rejected the claim
50
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for benefits because it did not meet the former ''unusual exertion" test. The Court
explained that the employee was performing those actions repetitively and in an enclosed
area and that it was reversing and remanding the Commission's decision for further
determination, because:
It is unclear from the record how many crates were moved by the claimant,
the distance the crates were moved, the precise weight of the crates, and the
size of the area in which the lifting and moving took place.51
The Court explained that the higher standard of the "legal causation" test
attempts to distinguish between injuries which:
(a) coincidentally occur at work because a preexisting condition results in
symptoms which appear during working hours without any enhancement
from the workplace, and (b) those injuries which occur because some
condition or exertion of employment increases the risk of injury which the
worker normally faces in everyday life.52
On a regular basis since Allen, compensation has been affirmed in preexisting
injury cases where the employee was engaged in activities which were such as to fall
within the category of activities of "normal everyday nonemployment life," but in a
manner which did not constitute part of "normal everyday nonemployment life." Thus,
compensation has been affirmed for the following: an employee cleaning food processing
equipment with high pressure water hoses which were operated similar to a gas pumps,
but on which the locks had recently broken so that the employee had to use continuous
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force to hold them in the u on" position;53 a machinist performing tasks comparable to
what he performed away from work, but in a repetitive manner different from what the
average person encountered in everyday life;54 a carpenter cleaning six inch by ten foot
steel fonns weighing 50 pounds while also tending a sump pump in an eight foot deep pit,
which required him to jump down onto a four foot shelf then four feet into the hole, a
total of eight times in thirty minute intervals;55 a stock room clerk who suffered back
injuries with gradual onset of pain, while lifting and carrying tubs which weighed 15 to
40 lbs each, depending on their contents, to a sorting area and stacking them, between
thirty and thirty-six times a day;56and an employee at a care center who was assisting a
one hundred and ninety pound patient to dress, holding the patient with one arm and
reached around with the other to straighten his T-shirt.57
This Court in Nyrehn5* further clarified the language of Allen. There, a stockroom
clerk suffered back injuries with a gradual onset of pain, while lifting and carrying tubs
which weighed 15 to 40 lbs each, depending on their contents, to a sorting area and
stacking them, between thirty and thirty-six times a day. The ALJ found that the
employee had failed to prove "legal causation" as required under Allen, but concluded
53
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that the "Allen test" was unconstitutional, and awarded benefits. The Commission, upon
Review, adopted the factual findings of the ALJ including the conclusion that the
employee had failed to prove "legal causation" under the "Allen test" and5 therefore,
reversed the award.
That Court concluded that the Commission had improperly based its determination
of a preexisting injury on pure assumption, but declared that failure was not fatal to the
Commission's decision because the employee's exertions met even the higher standard of
"legal cause." The Court, referring to the examples cited in Allen of everyday exertions,
explained:
While lifting a tub of merchandise weighing between 15 and 40 pounds
once or twice could likewise fit into the list of examples above, lifting such
a tub 30 to 36 times a day for two and a half months is not a typical
nonemployment activity. The foregoing moderately strenuous activities
which may not be considered unusual when performed once or twice may
nevertheless amount to unusual exertion when performed repeatedly.
Otherwise, garbage collectors, baggage handlers, auto mechanics, childcare
providers, etc., would be barred by the foregoing examples.59
The Court further explained:
The test is not whether the type of exertion which caused the injury is
unknown in nonemployment life, but rather whether the cumulative
work-related exertion exceeds the normal level of exertion in
nonemployment life.60
Getting into a car, absent any sudden unexpected event, could certainly be
classified as an exertion which employees would typically experience in everyday non}
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employment life. However, it cannot be said that striking one's head against the car door
frame while getting into the car is a typical experience in "everyday nonemployment life/'
any more than having a collision while driving the car would be. Sudden unexpected
events such as those may well occur to numerous people in their everyday life, but that
does not make them typical experiences in "everyday non-employment life."
American Roofing v. Green61 came to this same conclusion. There, an employee
was injured while attempting to unload a thirty pound bucket of debris over the bed of his
truck bed. He was lifting it out of the truck bed when the bucket suddenly snagged on
something and the employee felt a "lightning bolt" of pain in his back and legs. The
Commission found the incident to be compensable, declaring that the weight of the
bucket, the manner of lifting, and the fact that the bucket snagged, all combined to make
the incident unusual or extraordinary under Allen, although the weight of the bucket alone
would not have met "legal causation." This Court upheld the Commission's
determination without imposing any requirement that there be some determination by the
Commission of the precise amount of force involved when the bucket snagged.
Employee has also become aware of Schreiber v. Labor Comm 'n,62 a 1999
Memorandum Decision by this Court which, at first glance, appears to be a contrary
decision. Employee recognizes that Memorandum Decisions are generally not considered
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as precedent for anyone other than the specific parties involved in the case.

However,

Employee feels obligated to bring the case to the Court's attention because it did involve
a sudden unexpected event in which an employee with a preexisting back condition was
hit in the back with a rubber ball on the playground, and this Court upheld the
Commission's determination of a failure to establish "legal cause." It is important to note,
however, that, unlike the Commission's detemiination in Mr. Verburg's case, the
Commission's determination in Schreiber that the force of the ball was "relatively minor,
comparable to the jostling one frequently encounters in crowds," was supported by
substantial evidence presented by the employer's biomechanical expert. This Court's
decision upholding the Commission's determination in that case was based upon the
existence of that substantial contrary evidence. No such contrary evidence appears in Mr.
Verburg's case.
Employee respectfully submits that the Commission applied the Allen test for
"legal causation" with regard to Mr. Verburg's case in an inappropriate manner, as more
fully reflected in Point II. Contrary to the Commission's declaration that, "Mr. Verburg's
exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no way to determine the force
with which he hit his head on his car door,"64 the uncontradicted evidence was sufficient
to establish that he had suffered an exertion sufficient to meet "legal cause." Striking his
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head in the manner he did on the door frame was an exertion beyond that "normally"
confronted in "everyday nonemployment life." The undisputed facts surrounding the
incident, as more fully set forth in this Employee's Statement of Facts65 do not reflect a
"relatively routine event" or a mere bump on the head. Rather, they reflect that
Employee's body was in motion from a standing to sitting position and being thrust
sideways toward the seat. It was with the full force of that momentum that he struck his
head halfway between the crown and the top of his head and ear on the door frame. At
impact, his vision went black for a few seconds and he just sat in the car. The incident
was significantly different from the mere bump on the head he had received previously on
the bottom of a garage door, when he did not have to stop what he was doing and his
vision did not go black.66 That undisputed evidence was fully in keeping with Judge
Lima's determination that:
The direct force Petitioner experienced moving from a standing to sitting
position while propelling his body sideways with such a force, that when he
struck his head his vision went black. .. The continuous movement of
Petitioner's body and weight added more force to the impact of Petitioner's
head and neck on the door jam which was unusual and extraordinary.67
The undisputed evidence in this case reasonably demonstrates that the the impact
to Employee's head with the door frame was of sufficient force to take it beyond the
realm of exertions undertaken in "normal everyday nonemployment life." He was not
65
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injured by the "normal" exertion of "everyday nonemployment life" in getting into his car
but, rather, by the "abnormal" sudden unexpected event of impacting his head against the
car door frame while doing so, a distinction not unlike that between a person injured
while climbing a normal flight of stairs as opposed to a person falling while doing so. In
finding to the contrary, the Commission failed to meet its obligation to "liberally construe
and apply the Act to provide coverage" and to resolve "any doubt respecting the right to
compensation in favor of the injured employee."68
The Commission's conclusion that the undisputed facts of this case failed to meet
Allen's "legal causation" test was erroneous, contrary to the law, and exceeded the bounds
of reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
POINT II
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN BASING ITS DECISION ON
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT ADEQUATE
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.
In supporting its conclusion that the facts of Employee's accident did not meet the
"legal causation" test of Allen, the Commission relied upon findings and conclusions
without adequate support in the record and which, rather, appear to have been based upon
the Commission's assumptions.
The Commission, in its Order Reversing ALJ's Decision and Denying Benefits,
concluded, "Mr. Verburg's exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no
way to determine the force with which he hit his head on his car door . . . The
6%
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Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision going dark is a
measure of impact."69
In its subsequent Order Denying Request for Reconsideration, the Commission
further concluded:
(1) The fact that Mr. Verburg experienced an unusual reaction to that event
- his vision 'going black' for a moment - does not change the nature or
force of the impact itself, but is more reasonably related to Mr. Verburg's
preexisting cervical problems."70
Judge Lima's Findings of Fact, which were not disputed by the parties,71
established a significant factual basis upon which Judge Lima and the Commission could
readily determine that the event in question involved an exertion which was not
comparable to that encountered in ''normal everyday nonemployment life," as was done in
American Roofing J2 Whether or not the precise quantum of force involved could be
determined was of no import. The Findings, with adequate support in the record,
determined that the impact was sufficient to meet the Allen test of "legal causation."
There was also no medical evidence, testimony, or other adequate support in the
record linking the fact of Employee's vision going black with any of his preexisting
cervical problems. Even if there had been such a relationship established in the medical
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records, it would not change the fact that it was the unusual exertion of that impact which
was the cause of his vision going black.
The Commission also improperly supported its denial of benefits with its
conclusion that/The Commission also notes the absence of any evidence of bruising or
other marks form the impact."73 None of the medical records reflected any absence of
bruising or other marks and there was no other evidence in the records concerning the
existence or non-existence of such items. It is also important to note that Employee did
not see a doctor until the first part of July, long enough after the accident that any such
bruising or marks would have significantly decreased or disappeared. Thus, these
unsupported conclusions again appear to have been based merely upon the Commission's
assumptions.
The Commission must have some evidentiary foundation upon which they base
their material findings, not just their assumptions. In Nyrehn, the Court explained:
Such material findings, however, may not be implied. In order for us to
meaningfully review the findings of the Commission, the findings must be
'"sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
[citing cases]. The failure of a trial court to make adequate findings is
reversible error. Id. Likewise, the failure of an agency to make adequate
findings of fact on material issues renders its findings 'arbitrary and
capricious' unless the evidence is "clear, uncontroverted and capable of
only one conclusion."74
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In Nyrehn, because the employee's actions met even the higher "legal causation"
standard, the Court explained that the Commission's failure to have adequate findings
supporting that assumption was harmless. However, in Mr. Verburg's case, that failure
severely prejudiced his right to compensation.
The Commission's determinations on these issues further reflect a significant
inconsistency in its approach to determining whether Employee met the "legal causation"
test under Allen. While denying that Employee's vision going black supports a
determination of the significant force of the impact, and ignoring Employee's comparison
of the minor impact with the garage door, the Commission implies that "bruising or other
marks" would have supported a determination of a more forceful impact. However, no
indication is made as to why bruises would support the significant force of that impact
more than Employee's vision going black, nor is there any reference in the record that the
incident did not, in fact, result in bruising or other marks. Rather, the record is simply
silent on that issue.
These determinations were made contrary to the Commission's obligation to
liberally construe and apply the Act to provide coverage and to resolve any doubt
respecting the right to compensation in favor of an injured employee. The Commission's
reliance upon its unsupported assumptions and inconsistent approaches to determining the
force of the impact was erroneous, contrary to the law, and exceeded the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality so as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The Commission's conclusion that Employee failed to meet Allen's 'legal
causation" requirement was contrary7 to the uncontradicted evidence at the Hearing before
Judge Lima. In reaching its conclusion, the Commission applied Allen in an erroneous
manner, improperly based findings upon its own assumptions and without adequate
support in the record, and failed to comply with its obligation to liberally construe and
apply the Act to provide coverage and to resolve any doubt respecting the right to
compensation in favor of an injured employee. We respectfully submit that the Court
should reverse the Commission's November 19, 2007, Order Reversing ALJ's Decision
and Denying Benefits and reinstate the Order of Judge Lima dated October 6, 2005,
which determined that Employee had met the higher 'legal causation'' standard or, in the
alternative, remand the case to the Commission for further consideration in light of the
Court's determinations herein.
Respectfully submitted this E> day of May, 2008.

By:

I
Gary E. Atkin, SB# 0144
K. DawnAtkin, SB#6471
Attorneys for Employee, Michael Verburg
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MICHAEL VERBURG,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW AND ORDER

vs.

Case No. 04-1130

OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,
Respondent.

Judge Lorrie Lima

HEARING:

Room 336, Labor Commission, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah,
on June 7. 2005 8:30 a.m. The hearing was pursuant to Order and Notice
of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Louie Lima, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner, Michael Verburg, was present and represented by Dawn
Atkin, Esq.
The respondent, Ogden City Police Department, was represented by
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On December 13, 2004, Michael Verburg ("Petitioner") filed an Application for
Hearing and claimed entitlement to medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary
total, temporary partial and permanent partial disability compensation, travel expenses, interest
and other - wage rate and clothing allowance of $44.00. Petitioner's claim for workers
compensation benefits arose out of two industrial accidents on March 24, 2004, and June 17,
2004.
On December 28, 2004, the Ogden City Police Department ("Respondent") filed an
Answer and denied that Petitioner sustained compensable accidents due to a lack of legal and
medical nexus.
At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew his claim regarding the date of injury, March 24,
2004, based on an independent medical evaluation conducted by Dr. Terry Brown. Petitioner
also withdrew his claimed entitlement to temporary partial and permanent partial compensation.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Employment and Compensation.

Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Community Services Officer. His hourly
wage was $13.91 and he worked 40 hours per week. In addition, Petitioner received a clothing
allowance of $44.00 every two weeks. The clothing allowance was provided to Petitioner to pay
the costs of dry cleaning his uniform. The clothing allowance was added to his regular wage in
his paychecks. Petitioner reported to the Internal Revenue Sendee that he paid taxes on the
allowance.
Petitioner was married and he had one dependent child.
Respondent paid the following workers compensation benefits to Petitioner: (1)
temporary total compensation from July 6, 2004, to December 10, 2004, at a weekly benefit rate
of $376.00 [$13.91 X 40 = $556.50 X 2/3 = $371.12 plus $5.00 for spouse = $376.00] and (2)
medical expenses through December 10, 2004. At the hearing, Respondent conceded that
Petitioner's compensation rate should have included an additional $5.00 for one dependent child.
2. Industrial Accident.
On April 19, 2004, Petitioner had an anterior cervical diskectomy at C4-5 with
decompression of the nerve root, an anterior cervical fusion at C4-5 for degenerative disc disease
at C4-5. Medical Records Exhibit ("MRE"), p. 54. An impression of Petitioner's cervical spine
CT scan, on April 5, 2004, revealed multiple levels of degenerative disc disease superimposed on
post-op changes significant at C4-5, C3-4 followed by C5-6 and C7-T1. MRE, p. 44. Following
surgery, Petitioner was released to regular duty on June 8, 2004. Petitioner felt better than before
the surgery and he was happy with the result.
On June 17, 2004, at the conclusion of Petitioner's work shift, he was in the process of
sitting down into the driver's seat of his police vehicle when he hit his head on the door jamb.
Petitioner hit the top right side of his head above his ear. Petitioner's vision went black for a
second but he did not lose consciousness. Petitioner collected his personal items from the police
vehicle and he went home. Approximately one hour after arriving home, Petitioner's neck, head
and shoulders began to feel stiff and hurt. His pain progressively worsened.
On June 29, 2004, Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Brent Felix. MRE, p. 59. X-rays of
Petitioner's cervical spine showed a stable fusion.
On July 2, 2005, Petitioner was evaluated by the Ogden Clinic for neck pain. MRE, p.
138. On July 5, 2004, Petitioner was instructed by Respondent to present for an evaluation at
McKay-Dee Hospital Center. MRE, p. 1. The diagnosis was muscle strain of Petitioner's neck
and he was informed to return to work in four days and follow-up with his treating physician.
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On July 13, 2004, Dr. Felix noted that Petitioner experienced pain at the C7-T1 area as he
did prior to surgery. MRE, p. 59. Dr. Felix released Petitioner from work for four weeks.
On August 10, 2004, Dr. Felix noted that Petitioner continued to experience pam in the
C7-T1 area. MRE, p. 61. Dr. Felix further noted that Petitioner reported that he did well
following the surgery until he struck his head on the car door. Dr. Felix prescribed physical
therapy and pam management for Petitioner. He released Petitioner to return to work with a
restriction to not lift more than 10 pounds. Petitioner received physical therapy three times
weekly for two months. MRE, p. 71. On August 13, and 27, 2004, Dr. Matthew Pingree
evaluated Petitioner for left neck and shoulder pain increased at least 50% since June 17, 2004.
MRE, pp. 179-183. Dr. Pingree prescribed pain medication, a TENS trial and physical therapy.
He released Petitioner from work.
On October 1, 2004, an impression of Petitioner's cervical spine revealed a satisfactory
post-op cervical spine. MRE, p. 52. On October 18, 2004, Petitioner reported an increase in
neck pain and headaches. MRE, p. 69. On October 26, and November 12, 2004, Dr. Pingree
requested a MRI scan of Petitioner's cervical spine. He noted that Petitioner was on family
leave. MRE. pp. 191-194.
On December 30, 2004, Dr. Pingree released Petitioner to return to work on January 7,
2005, with lifting restrictions of 50 pounds and no bending, twisting. MRE, p. 194A. On
January 10, 2005, Petitioner returned to work at Respondent.
On March 7 and 21, 2005, Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Kevin Gardner for persistent
neck pain. MRE, pp. 154 and 157. He was prescribed pain medication.
On June 2, 2005, Dr. Brown issued an independent medical evaluation of Petitioner.
MRE, pp. 226-232. Dr. Brown noted that Petitioner suffered from a preexisting condition of his
cervical spine that contributed to his complaints. Dr. Brown opined a medical nexus between
Petitioner's injury on June 17, 2004. and his complaints of increased cervical spine pain. Dr.
Brown further opined that Petitioner was medically stable but had ongoing significant pain. Dr.
Brown noted that the medical treatment Petitioner received after June 17, 2004, was medically
necessary due to the industrial injury. Dr. Brown further noted that future treatment of
Petitioner's condition would include pain management for significant neck pain and no surgery.
Currently, Petitioner is prescribed a Duragesic patch, Percocet for break through pain and
Advil for his cervical pain.
3. Prior Cervical Spine History.
On November 19, 2002, an impression of Petitioner's cervical spine revealed multi-level
disk disease, the most pronounced at C5-6, broad-based herniation on the anterior thecal sac and
distortion and impingement on the left anterior aspect of the cervical, and broad based bulging
and hernaition at C6-7. MRE, pp. 18-19. On December 10, 2002, Petitioner had an anterior
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discectomy with microsurgical decompression and internal plate fixation at C5-6 and C-67.
MRE,p. 25.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Employment and Compensation.
At all times relevant to this claim Respondent employed Petitioner as a Community
Sendees Officer.
Section 34A-2-409 of the Workers' Compensation Act bases the amount of compensation
to be awarded an injured employee on his average weekly wage at the time of his industrial
injury. In Craig Burnham Produce v. Industrial Commission, 657 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1983), the
Utah Supreme Court held that the Legislature granted generous powers to the Industrial
Commission to determine what may be included in "wages" to enable the Commission to
"fashion a method that would, "' based on the facts presented, fairly determine the employee's
average weekly wage.'" See Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-409(2).
hi Blake Stevens Constr. v. Henion, 697 P.2d (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court
determined that "[b]efore any part of such allowances or reimbursements can be considered as
part of the employee's "wages" there should be some showing that the payments are more than
sufficient to reimburse the employee for the work-related expenses so that in effect the excess
can be considered as extra compensation to the workman for his sendees performed." (quoting
Moorehead v. Industrial Commission, 495 P.2d 866 (Ariz. 1972). Therefore, under that analysis,
the Court in Blake held that, under the real economic gain rule, the decedent's subsistence
allowance could not be included in the average weekly wage without a finding, based on the
facts, that the allowance constituted real economic gain.
hi the instant case, Petitioner received a biweekly allowance for the cost of dry cleaning
his work uniform. The extra benefit provided by Respondent was directly related to meeting a
special expense due to Petitioner's employment and will cease upon Petitioner's separation from
his employment. However, Petitioner has not shown that the clothing allowance, in part or in its
entirety, was more than sufficient to reimburse him for the work-related expense and thereby
realized a real economic gain. Accordingly, Petitioner's clothing allowance cannot be included
in his average weekly wage.
Based on the foregoing, at the time of the accident in issue, Petitioner was married with
one dependent child. Petitioner's appropriate rate for temporary total compensation was 381.00
[$13.91 X 40 - $556.50 X 2/3 - $371.12 plus $10.00 for spouse and dependent child - $381.12].
2. Legal Causation.
In order to recover workers' compensation benefits, an employee must prove that he was
injured "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment." Utah Code
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Ann. §34A-2-401. Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) requires: (1) that
the injury be "'by accident,"1 and (2) that "'there be a causal connection between the injury and
the employment."' Allen then requires a claimant to show both medical and legal causation. In
the instant case, the medical nexus and "by accident" components are not at issue. All that is
pending is whether Petitioner earned his burden of proving legal causation.
In Allen, the Utah Supreme Court held that a claimant with a preexisting non-industrial
condition that contributed to his current medical condition must meet a more stringent test for
legal causation: the claimant must show that his work-related activities exceeded the exertions of
his normal everyday life. The undisputed medical evidence, including Respondents'
independent medical examiner, demonstrates that Petitioner suffered from a preexisting cervical
spine condition that contributed to his injury of June 17, 2004. Consequently, Petitioner must
satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation.
The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that the direct force Petitioner
experienced moving from a standing to sitting position while propelling his body sideways with
such a force, that when he struck his head his vision went black, was not a typical exertion
experienced by men and women in modern non-employment life. While getting into a motor
vehicle is typical of modem non-employment life, such exertion does not typically involve the
combination of factors presented here. Specifically, the continuous movement of Petitioner's
body and weight added more force to the impact of Petitioner's head and neck on the door j a m
which was unusual or extraordinary and satisfies the requirement of legal causation. This extra
exertion served to offset the preexisting condition of Petitioner as a likely cause of the injury.
Moreover, how Petitioner felt before and after the June 17, 2004, evidences the degree of force
exerted by Petitioner. Following surgery in April 2004, Petitioner felt better than before the
surgery and he was happy with the result. However, following June 17, 2004, Petitioner
experienced significantly increased pain in his cervical spine.
Finally, in concluding that that facts of Petitioner's injury satisfied the higher legal
causation standard, it is the duty of the Labor Commission to construe the Workers'
Compensation Act liberally and in favor of employee coverage when statutory terms reasonably
admit of such a construction. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990).
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's exertion at the time of his accident was sufficient to
satisfy the applicable standard of legal causation. Consequently, Petitioner's injury arose out of
his employment at Respondent is compensable under §34A-2-401 of the Workers'
Compensation Act.
3. Travel Expenses.
Petitioner did not submit any travel mileage documentation.
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ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Respondents shall pay to Petitioner temporary total
compensation at the weekly rate of $381.00 from December 11, 2004, to January 10, 2005, or
4.42 weeks, for a total of $1,684.02. The amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum.
IT FURTHER ORDERED: Respondents shall pay to Petitioner temporary total
compensation of an additional $5.00 (for an additional dependent child) per week from July 6,
2004, to December 10, 2004, or 22.57 weeks, for a total of $112.85. The amount is accrued, due
and payable in a lump sum plus interest at eight percent (8%) per annum. Respondents are
credited a total of $8,433.68 of temporary total compensation already paid to Petitioner from July
6, 2004, to December 10, 2004.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: Respondents shall pay the statutory attorneys' fees of
$359.37, plus twenty percent (20%) of the interest awarded herein, directly to Dawn Atkin, Esq.
pursuant to Utah Code Aim. §34A-l-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That
amount shall be deducted from Petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Ms. Atkin.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: Respondents shall pay all medical expenses, including
any out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Petitioner, reasonably related to his industrial accident
reasonably related to Petitioner's industrial accident pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-418(l),
and the medical and surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, and any travel
allowances hereinafter incurred pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20, plus
interest at eight percent (8%) per annum, under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah
Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-213.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: Petitioner's claim for temporary total and permanent
partial compensation are dismissed without prejudice.
DATED October 6, 2005.

Lorrie LiffisP' J )
Administrative Law Judge
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on October 6, 2005, to the persons/parties at the
following addresses:
K Dawn Atkin Esq
H U E Brickyard Rd Ste 206
Salt Lake City UT 84106
Sharon J Eblen Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

UT^H-LABOR COMPASSION

Clerk, Adjudication Division
POBox 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
MICHAEL VERBURG,
Petitioner,

ORDER REVERSING
ALJ'S DECISION AND
DENYING BENEFITS

vs.
OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

i

Case No. 04-1130

Respondent.

The Ogden City Police Department (uOCPD" hereafter) asks the Utah Labor Commission to
review Administrative Law Judge Lima's award of benefits to Michael Verburg under the Utah
Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act"; Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 63-46b-12 and § 34A-2-801(3).
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Verburg claims workers' compensation benefits for a cervical injur}7 allegedly resulting
from an accident that occurred on June 17, 2004. as he was working as a police officer for OCPD.
After an evidentiary hearing, Judge Lima awarded benefits to Mr. Verburg.
In challenging Judge Lima's decision. OCPD argues that Mr. Verburg's work accident does
not satisfy the more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation that is applicable to Mr.
Verburg's claim.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties do not dispute Judge Lima's findings of fact. As material to the issue now before
the Commission, those facts are as follows.
Mr. Verburg has a degenerative cervical condition that is unrelated to his work at OCPD. He
underwent spinal surgery during 2002 and again during April 2004. He returned to work at OCPD
on June 8,2004. On June 17.2004, as he was entering his police car and sitting down in the driver's
seat, he hit the right side of his head on the top of the car door. His vision went dark for a moment,
but he did not lose consciousness. He then went on with his work activities. He experienced pain
and stiffness in his neck, head and shoulders about an hour later.
Beginning on June 29, 2004. Mr. Verburg received medical care for his neck pain and was
restricted from work. He new seeks workers' compensation benefits for this aggravation of his
preexisting neck condition.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers injured by accident
"arising out of and in the course o f employment. Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401. To qualify for
benefits under the foregoing standard, an injured worker must establish, among other elements, that
his or her work was the "legal cause" of the injury in question. Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729
P.2d 15, 25 (Utah 1986). In the case now' before the Commission, the question is whether Mr.
Verburg's accident—hitting the side of his head on a car frame—satisfies this requirement of "legal
causation."
In Allen, Ibid, the Utah Supreme Court discussed the context in which the requirement of
"legal causation" is applied.
Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of employment is difficult to
determine where the employee brings to the workplace a personal element of risk
such as a preexisting condition. Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition,
he or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear that
"the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an industrial accident is
compensable . . . ." (Citation omitted.) To meet the legal causation requirement, a
claimant with a preexisting condition must show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of
his condition. This additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by
an exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday life.
In its subsequent decision in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d I079,
1082 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court described the test for legal causation as follows:
Under Allen, an usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with
the employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the
employment activity involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and
above the "usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life.1'
The
requirement of "unusual or extraordinary' exertion" is designed to screen out those
injuries that result from a personal condition which the worker brings to the job,
rather than from exertions required of the employee in the workplace. (Citations
omitted; emphasis added.)
The parties agree that, because Mr. Verburg suffered from a preexisting condition that
contributed to the cervical problems for which he now claims benefits, Mr. Verburg must satisfy the
more stringent prong of the Allen test for legal causation. Thus, Mr. Verburg must establish that the
work accident of June 17, 2004, constituted an "unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the
usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial
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Commission, Ibid. Some of the examples cited in Allen as typical of nonemployment exertion are
"taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel changing a flat tire on
an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings."
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Allen, the Commission has considered legal causation
in the context of many types of exertion. Usually, the exertion can be easily classified as "unusual or
extraordinary'" and compensable, or "usual and ordinary'* and noncompensable. Mr. Verburg "s
exertion is more difficult to characterize because there is no way to determine the force with which
he hit his head on his car door. And. while it is not uncommon to hit one's head on a car door frame,
a car trunk, or an open cabinet, it is also possible to imagine circumstances where such a blow is
sufficiently forceful to constitute an unusual or extraordinary exertion.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission has carefully considered the
available information regarding Mr. Verburg's work accident on June 17. 2004. It appears to have
been a relatively routine event in which he bumped his head as he slid into the drivers seat. The
Commission is unconvinced that Mr. Verburg's testimony of his vision going dark is a measure of
the force of impact. The Commission also notes the absence of any evidence of bruising or other
marks from the impact. In summary, the Commission finds that the evidence does not establish that
the exertion involved in Mr. Verburg's accident was unusual or extraordinary. Because Mr. Verburg
has not satisfied the more stringent test for legal causation that is applicable to his claim, the
Commission concludes that Mr. Verburg is not entitled to workers* compensation benefits.
ORDER
The Commission grants OCPD's motion for review, sets aside Judge Lima's award of
benefits to Mr. Verburg. and dismisses Mr. Verburg's claim for benefits with prejudice. It is so
ordered.

/(A
Dated this / /

day of November, 2007.

Sherrie H&yashi
Utah Labor Commissioner
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received b} the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, an}' part} may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. An} such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Reversing ALTs Decision and Denying Benefits
in the matter of Michael Verburg, Case No. 04-1130, was mailed first class postage prepaid this / f
day of November. 2007, to the following:
Michael Verburg
2211 N 4425 W
Plain City UT 84404
Ogden City Police Department
2186 Lincoln Ave
Ogden UT 84401
K. Dawn Atkin, Esq.
H U E Brickyard Rd Ste 206
Salt Lake City UT 84106
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

00062

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
MICHAEL VERBURG,
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR RECONSIDERATION

OGDEN CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

Case No. 04-1130

Respondent.

Michael Verburg asks the Utah Labor Commission to reconsider its prior decision deir\ ing
Mr. Verburg's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act": Title 34A,
Chapter 2. Utah Code Annotated).
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated § 63-46b-13.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Verburg. a police officer with Ogden Cit} Police Department ("OCPD"). seeks workers'
compensation benefits for a cervical injury allegedly caused or aggravated when he hit his head on
the door frame as he was getting into the driver" s seat of his police car. After an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Lima awarded benefits to Mr. Verburg. OCPD then requested Commission review. On
November 19.2007. the Commission reversed Judge Lima's award and denied Mr. Verburg*s claim
for benefits on the grounds his accident was not the "legal cause" of his cervical injur}7.
Mr. Verburg now asks the Commission to reconsider its decision. Mr. Verburg argues that
the Commission failed to appreciate the force of the impact that occurred as he hit his head on the
car's door frame. Mr. Verburg contends that this force is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of legal
causation.
DISCUSSION
The Commission has reviewed the evidential*} record in this matter, with particular attention
to the accident that occurred as Mr. Verburg was getting into his car. Based on the evidence, the
Commission reaffirms its finding that Mr. Verburg experienced a relatively routine event in which he
bumped his head as he slid into the driver's seat. The fact that Mr Verburg experienced an unusual
reaction to that event—his vision "going black1" for a moment—does not change the nature or force
of the impact itself, but is more reasonably related to Mr. Verburg* s preexisting cervical problems.
The Commission's previous decision has explained in some detail the standard for legal
causation that is applicable to Mr. Verburg's claim. That explanation will not be repeated, except to
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note that the Commission has again considered Mr. Verburg's arguments but again concludes that
Mr. Verburg's accident does not satisfy the test for legal causation that is applicable to Mr.
Verburg's claim.
ORDER
The Commission affirms its previous decision in this matter and denies Mr. Verburg's
request for reconsideration. It is so ordered.

it

Dated this IT

day of January, 2008.

C-L
Sherrie Hayashi
Utah L^abor Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS

Any party may appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition For Review
with that Court within 30 days of the date of this Order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a cop) of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Reconsideration in the matter
of Michael Verburg, Case No. 04-1130, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid this )j day of
January, 2008. to the following:
Michael Verburg
221 I N 4425 W
Plain Citj UT 84404
Ogden City Police Department
2186 Lincoln Ave
Ogden UT 84401
K Dawn Atkin Esq
H U E Briclcyard Rd Ste 206
Salt Lake City UT 84106
Sharon J Eblen Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission
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BILLINGS, Judge:
Kristine S. Schreiber, a playground supervisor employed by
the Jordan School District, appeals the Labor Commission's denial
of workers* compensation benefits. Schreiber had a history of
back problems, including back surgery. The Labor Commission
determined that an accident that occurred on a playground when a
rubber ball struck Schreiber in the back was not the legal cause
of her injury.
In order to show legal cause, "a claimant with a preexisting
[medical] condition must show that the employment contributed
something substantial to increase the risk he already faced in
everyday life." Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 25
(Utah 1986). To establish a work-related nexus of legal
causation under Allen, a claimant with a preexisting condition
must prove that the accident in question resulted from "unusual
or extraordinary exertion." Id. at 26.
The Legislature has explicitly granted broad discretion to
the Labor Commission to "determine the facts and apply the law in
this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers." Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997). When discretion is delegated to an
agency by statute, its interpretation or application of law
receives intermediate review under the Utah Administrative
Procedure Act (UAPA). See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(i)

(1997); Morton Int'1, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581,
587-89 (Utah 1991). x Thus, we must determine "whether the Labor
Commission's decision exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality." Osman Home Improvement v. Industrial Comm'n, 958
P.2d 240, 243 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); see also Johnson Bros.
Constr. v. Labor Comm'n, 967 P.2d 1258, 1259 (Utah Ct. App.
1998); Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n, 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
We cannot say that the Labor Commission's determination was
unreasonable. The Labor Commission determined that the direct
force of the ball was "relatively minor, comparable to the
jostling one frequently encounters in crowds," and that
Schreiber's surprised reaction "does not appear to be different
from the everyday event of tripping on a rug or a [sic] uneven
sidewalk." The validity of these comparisons was supported by
substantial evidence presented by the School District's
biomechanical expert during the hearing.
Tripping without falling, and being startled in the process,
can reasonably be considered a part of ordinary nonemployment
life. The Labor Commission found that Schreiber's accident
involved a comparable level of exertion--a finding of fact
supported by the record--and thus reasonably concluded that her
accident was not the legal cause of her injury. We therefore
affirm the Labor Commission's decision.

£

\d£&jWI- SU&Hfri)

Judith M. Billings, Judge

WE CONCUR:
-z*+iu

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge

!2L*at irt

Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. It is important to note that § 34A-1-301(1997), formerly
§ 35-1-16 (1994), was enacted in 1994, well before Schreiber's
1996 accident. See Act of Indus. Comm'n Auth., ch. 207 §1, 1994
Utah Laws 972. Appellant, in arguing that we must review the
Commission's decision for correctness, relies primarily on cases
arising before this express grant of discretion was given to the
agency by statute.

